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METHODOLOGY TO PERFORM CYBER LETHALITY ASSESSMENT  
 
Matthew W. Zurasky 
Old Dominion University, 2017 
Director: John Adams 
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Lethality and 
Effectiveness Branch is the Navy’s subject matter experts (SME) on target vulnerability, weapon 
lethality, and weapon effectiveness.  Branch personnel currently exercise expertise in the kinetic 
and directed energy weapon domains.  When the Navy develops weapons in the kinetic and 
directed energy domains, there are clear and well established procedures and methodologies for 
performing target characterization that support weapon-target pairing.  Algorithms exist to 
describe the likelihood of damage effects.  It is natural that in the paradigm shift to cyberspace 
warfare that the Branch provide these same services to the warfighter in the cyber domain.  In 
simplistic terms, cyberspace lethality is the opposite side of the cybersecurity coin.  Rather than 
protecting own-systems, a cyber-offensive capability is applied to an adversary’s network to 
disrupt normal operations.  However, there are currently no established procedures or 
methodologies for performing cyberspace target vulnerability characterization (CTVC) or cyber 
lethality and effectiveness analyses.  Nor is there any organization currently dedicated to 
performing these tasks.  Previous efforts were conducted stand-alone and did not produce a 
meaningful or accepted methodology.  This dissertation is intended to research existing lethality 
prediction processes for kinetic and directed energy weapons and modify them for the new cyber 
weapon realm such that the new methodologies will allow analysts to perform effective and 
efficient CTVC and cyber weapon lethality performance assessments.  The methodology will be 
presented to the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness for 
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consideration and adaptation.  The cyber lethality research and methodology development has 
the support of NSWCDD management which has designated cyber warfare engineering to be a 
thrust within the NSWCDD 2015-2020 Strategic Plan.  This thrust includes providing support for 
offensive cyber operations through the experimentation, development, test and evaluation, 
training, integration, and certification of combat and weapon systems that will allow the naval 
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This thesis is dedicated to the proposition that the quest for knowledge should never end.  




"One's work may be finished someday, but one's education never."  
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CCB  Configuration Control Board  
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DMod  Data Modification 
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PK/H  Probability of Kill given a Hit 
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The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Lethality and 
Effectiveness Branch is the Navy’s subject matter expert (SME) on threat vulnerability, weapon 
lethality, and weapon effectiveness.  Branch personnel demonstrate expertise in the kinetic and 
directed energy weapon domains.  The Lethality and Effectiveness Branch ensures that 
warfighters employ effective weapons by providing decision-makers with objective technical 
assessments of engagement options. The mission is accomplished through the application of four 
core capabilities:   
• The ability to quantify the performance of complex weapon systems,  
• The ability to define & exploit the threat,  
• The ability to capture the dynamics of weapon/threat interaction in mathematically 
tractable models, and  
• The ability to perform first principles numerical calculations (Zurasky, 2015). 
 
1.1 Purpose 
It is natural that in the paradigm shift to cyberspace warfare that the Branch provide these 
same services to the warfighter in the cyber domain.  However, there are currently no established 
procedures or methodologies for performing cyberspace target vulnerability characterization 
(CTVC) or cyber lethality and effectiveness analyses.  Nor is there any organization currently 
dedicated to performing these tasks.  NSWCDD must close this capability gap to keep pace with 
new technology development.  The Branch finds itself in the same situation that the French 
Committee of Artillery reported to their Minister of War in 1800:  “Ici il n’est pas question de 
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changer, il faut créer [Here there is no question of changing, it is necessary to create]” (Dahlgren, 
1852).   
 
1.2 Problem 
This dissertation is intended to research and adapt existing lethality prediction processes for 
kinetic and directed energy weapons to the new cyber weapon realm such that the new 
methodologies will allow analysts to perform effective and efficient CTVC and cyber weapon 
lethality performance assessments.  This dissertation will propose a methodology to bridge the 
capability gap while meeting the security and data distribution requirements imposed by the 
Navy and the Department of Defense.   
 
1.3 Method and Procedure 
This dissertation is developed from unclassified public sources and public release 
information from government sources.  This will limit some of the details available to describe 
the methodology, but it has the benefit of eliminating any concerns relative to security or 
releasability of the information.  Also, this paper refers to a “cyber target” and a “cyber threat” 
interchangeably.  Both of these terms refer to the adversarial system that is to be exploited by the 
cyber weapon. 
 




2. BACKGROUND / HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Military mission planners rely upon validated weapon and target information to 
determine the probability of success for mission scenarios.  A process exists within the 
Department of Defense to match kinetic weapons to targets so that an optimum solution can be 
selected.  A similar process for cyber weapons is necessary or the United States military will 
cede this aspect of warfare to adversarial parties; combatant commanders will not utilize cyber 
warfare without knowing the effects it will produce or the potential collateral damage that may 
occur.   
There is limited academic or professional literature relating to the assessment of cyber 
weapon lethality.  A few companies have performed studies at the behest of the U.S. 
Government but these efforts are classified and are not releasable in this forum.  Others have 
documented aspects of the cyber defense perspective.   
Joint Publication 3-12(R) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) provides the military’s 
doctrine regarding the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of joint cyberspace 
operations.  This document introduces cyberspace and its integration across the range of military 
operations.  The doctrine describes three layers of cyberspace, as shown in Figure 1:  the 
physical network layer, the logical network layer, and the social (cyber-persona) network layer.  
The document also discusses roles and responsibilities relating to the planning and coordination 
of cyberspace operations.   




Figure 1  Cyber Domains 
Some activities have developed schemas and nomenclature to describe characteristics of 
malware and other cyber capabilities.  The Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization 
(MAECTM) language developed by the Mitre Corporation is one example of this (Beck, Kirillov, 
& Chase, 2014).  Mitre also developed the Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator 
Information (TAXIITM) framework that defines a set of message exchanges and services to share 
information (Connolly, Davidson, & Schmidt, 2014).  Using its kill-chain model, Lockheed 
Martin describes the phases of intrusions and indicators that may identify patterns of an 
advanced persistent threat (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2014).  These authors propose an 
intelligence feedback loop to decrease an adversary’s likelihood of success with each subsequent 
intrusion attempt.  This is a precursor to predicting cyber weapon performance.   
The U.S. Army Cyber Command tasked the RAND Corporation to study and develop a 
strategy for providing cyber support to units at the Army corps level and below (RAND 
Corporation, 2017).  The resulting document describes the overarching goals, objectives, and 
associated activities for these forces. Part of this strategy describes what the Army needs to do to 
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implement an overall vision for tactical cyber operations.  In addition, the report discusses the 
potential incorporation and use of offensive cyber operations, specifically at the tactical level.   
However, without a standardized and accepted methodology to predict cyber weapon 
performance, cyber capability will not be released to the corps or equivalent level and will 
remain limited in its applications to strategic targets.   
 
2.2 Development of Weapons and Systematic Analyses 
Mankind has developed and utilized weapons since the earliest recorded history.  Ancient 
cave and rock drawings show humans using spears and bows for hunting.  Over time, stone and 
wood were replaced with metals such as copper, bronze, and iron.  Eventually gunpowder was 
invented and kinetic weapons using lead, iron, and steel shot became commonplace.  
Accordingly, critical scientific methods have been applied to the development of kinetic 
weapons.  Analyses of threat systems characteristics and the calculations of interactions between 
kinetic weapon systems and threat systems have been conducted for many years.  Benjamin 
Robins published his New Principles of Gunnery in 1742.  In it he expressed mathematical 
equations to describe factors such as the effects of air resistance on projectiles.  He also noted 
that the penetration depth achieved by musket balls appeared to be a function of the ratios of the 
square of their velocities (Collins).    
The United States followed European practices and established schools and curriculums 
for military sciences.  At the insistence of President Washington, Congress in 1794 authorized 
the establishment of a "Corps of Artillerist and Engineers" at West Point, New York.  No formal 
course of study was adopted, so President Thomas Jefferson proposed and signed legislation on 
16 March 1802 establishing that a Corps of Engineers "… shall be stationed at West Point and 
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constitute a Military Academy …" to focus on science and engineering (Ambrose, 1999).  
Likewise, in 1825, President John Quincy Adams asked Congress to establish a Naval Academy 
"for the formation of scientific and accomplished officers."  His proposal, however, was not 
acted upon until 20 years later when, through the efforts of the Secretary of the Navy George 
Bancroft, the Naval School was established without Congressional funding.  The curriculum for 
the initial class of 50 midshipmen included mathematics, navigation, gunnery, and steam.  In 
1850 Congress authorized the Naval School to become the United States Naval Academy (U.S. 
Navy).   
In addition to having separate methods and academies to train officers, up until the post-
World War II era and the establishment of the Department of Defense (DoD), the War 
Department and the Department of the Navy handled their business separately.  For the Navy, 
the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography was established by Congress in 1842 to develop new 
weapons and ordnance materiel, to improve existing items, and, in wartime, to oversee large-
scale production and procurement of such equipment.  In 1862 the Bureau was divided into 
separate commands as the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Navigation.  The first Chief of 
the Bureau of Ordnance, Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, played a significant role in the 
development of naval gunnery.  First in the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and then as 
the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Admiral Dahlgren applied scientific methods to become 
the “father of modern naval ordnance” (U.S. Navy).  In doing so, Admiral Dahlgren became an 
ordnance expert, developed a percussion lock, and wrote a number of books, including The 
System of Boat Armaments in the United States Navy, Shells and Shell Guns, and Naval 
Percussion Locks and Primers.  Under his command, the Navy established its own foundry to 
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manufacture new equipment.  Its first product was the boat howitzer, designed for use aboard 
ships and in landings.  
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, named for Rear Admiral 
Dahlgren, has been at the forefront of performing these types of analyses for nearly one hundred 
years.  Figure 2 illustrates an early lethality test performed at Dahlgren in 1922.  Test data today 
is used to develop high fidelity and engineering level models that are engaged to determine 
probability of occurrences of lethal and non-lethal events.   
Eventually, Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara saw the benefit of standardized 
practices across all the military services and established the tri-service Joint Technical 
Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME).  Currently, NSWCDD is a leading 
Navy participant in the JTCG/ME and is actively improving vulnerability, lethality, and 
effectiveness simulation models.   
 
 
Figure 2 Lethality Test Performed at Naval Proving Grounds Dahlgren in 1922 
 
2.3 Tri-Service Systematic Processes for Kinetic and Directed Energy Weapons 
The JTCG/ME was established in 1964 to provide warfighters, operational commanders, 
DoD targeteers, weaponeers, planners, weapon system designers, and logisticians with the most 
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current and accurate non-nuclear weapons effectiveness data.  JTCG/ME is a tri-service 
organization whose approved data is available to authorized personnel. Since the 1960’s the 
JTCG/ME has governed a standardized process that is accepted by all three services within the 
DoD.  The standardized process outlines common test data collection practices and modeling 
methodologies.  The principal products of the JTCG/ME are known as the Joint Munitions 
Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs).  The JMEM information includes damage/kill probabilities for 
specific weapons and threats, physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon 
systems, threat vulnerability, obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and 
procedures for assessing munitions effectiveness (U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis 
Activity, 2016).  The JMEMs were developed to provide a set of data developed with known 
methodologies that would permit a standardized comparison of weapon effectiveness across all 
three service communities (Driels M.).  Combatant commanders and mission planners in the 
field can use the JMEM information to determine the best combination of weapon ordnance and 
tactics to attack and render inoperable enemy systems and structures.   
The JTCG/ME has recently adapted its standard kinetic energy threat vulnerability 
characterization process to directed energy weapons through the High Energy Laser Review 
Analysis and Process Team (HEL-RAPT) efforts.  The current JTCG/ME kinetic and laser 
processes determine the vulnerability of threat platforms, weapons, and infrastructure, predict the 
ability of an ordnance package to inflict damage to a threat, and measure the ability of a weapon 
to engage and inflict damage given the performance and environmental conditions.  Thus, field 
commanders have the ability to pair both kinetic and directed energy weapons to threats.   
The JTCG/ME process has evolved to reflect the increased capabilities of models and 
computational systems.  However, newer methodologies continue to use foundational principles 
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that are now well  established.  For example, the following definitions have been established and 
are accepted in the vulnerability/lethality community (Zurasky, 2015):   
• Vulnerability – the characteristic of a threat that causes it to suffer functional 
degradation as a result of manmade damage (Threat Vulnerability) 
• Lethality – the ability of a munition to inflict damage on a threat sufficient to cause 
functional degradation in its ability to complete its designated mission(s) (Weapon 
Lethality) 
• Effectiveness – the overall ability of a weapon system to engage and inflict damage 
on a vehicle sufficient to cause functional degradation (Weapon System 
Effectiveness). 
 
2.4 Systematic Analyses for Electronic Warfare and Psychological Operations 
The kinetic and directed energy weapons that physically damage an incoming threat – 
and thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead or propulsion in such a way that the 
intended effect on the threat is severely impeded – are designated as hard-kill measures.   
Electronic warfare is the military action that involves the use of electromagnetic energy 
to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action 
that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (Frieden, 1985).  Psychological 
operations are “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior 
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.  The purpose of psychological 
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's 
objectives” (Naef, 2011).  Electronic warfare and psychological operations are designated soft-
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kill measures.  These methods are more dependent upon outside influences than kinetic and 
directed energy weapons to be effective.  They also have a more difficult time predicting and 
evaluating performance.   
Most stakeholders in the military environment (warfighters, acquisition professionals, 
Congressional staffers) understand the contributions of hard-kill measures against materiel.  That 
is, while they may not be able to quantify the exact tonnage of bombs or missiles to destroy a 
threat, they certainly understand that bombs and missiles can be used to destroy materiel threats.  
However, there is a lack of shared knowledge relative to soft-kill methods such as electronic 
warfare and psychological operations.  This leads to pressure to provide more thoughtful and 
explicit documentation to decision makers.  While there is a burden to develop and provide the 
increased information to decision makers, there can be significant benefits for future soft-kill 
measures.  An improved shared understanding of the return on investment can potentially 
improve advocacy for these efforts and also improve the efforts themselves by imposing more 
rigorous assessments (Paul, Yeats, Clarke, Matthews, & Skrabala, 2015).   
For electronic warfare, mission planners attempt to qualitatively predict its effectiveness.  
The electronic warfare contribution is required to be effective at a particular time and location.  
However, the electronic warfare contribution is currently not very well quantified; instead it is 
predicted to be non-existent, fair, or potentially likely to be effective.  For this reason it is often 
considered to be an ancillary contributor and so is not counted upon for mission planning 
purposes.   
Psychological operations are often unconstrained by a particular location or time element.  
Although psychological operations should include a time horizon for their completion, changing 
behaviors can require significant investments in time and resources.  Thus, due to the long-term 
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nature, many psychological operations do not lend themselves to intermediate or periodic 
progress measurements (Paul, Yeats, Clarke, Matthews, & Skrabala, 2015). 
 
2.5 Required Evolution to Assess Cyber Weapons 
In just a few decades, the Navy moved from a fleet of sail and steam-powered ships to a 
high-tech fleet with nuclear-powered vessels (submarines and surface ships) and supersonic 
aircrafts.  The service is now undergoing another significant change to adopt cyberspace as a 
new warfighting domain.  Others have recognized this situation.  Israeli Major General Aviv 
Kochavi has stated that cyber warfare “will soon be revealed to be the biggest revolution in 
warfare, more than gunpowder and the utilization of air power in the last century” (United Press 
International, 2014).   
The January 2012 announcement by the DoD that it plans to enable the U.S. military to 
conduct a “combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and 
cyberspace” makes it clear that we are moving past the time of strictly using kinetic weapons 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).  The Navy Information Dominance Roadmap for 2013-
2028 emphasizes that Navy Integrated Fires (IF) will coordinate all elements within the blue kill 
chain and disrupt adversary kill chains.  This will allow U.S. Naval forces to seize and hold the 
initiative in combat and to limit an enemy’s freedom of maneuver and action. The Roadmap 
states that IF will require new capabilities to fully employ integrated information in warfare by 
expanding the use of offensive cyber effects to complement existing and planned kinetic 
weapons within the battlespace (U.S. Navy, 2013).   
Cyber lethality finds itself in a situation similar to the soft-kill weapons; most DoD 
stakeholders do not have an intrinsic understanding of the process or potential outcomes of cyber 
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weapons.  Therefore, it is imperative that commanders be given a measure of the predicted 
performance of cyberspace weapons.   Without this commanders won’t be able to properly weigh 
the benefit of offensive cyberspace capabilities. 





3.1 Assigning a Methodology to Cyber Lethality 
As reported by The Economist magazine, a senior defense official implied that cyber 
weapons will be used as an adjunct to conventional weapons and noted that “if a cyber attack is 
to be used as a military weapon, you want a predictable time and effect” (War in the fifth 
domain, 2010).  More recently, the Defense Science Board presented a new report on cyber 
deterrence to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee.  The report proposes the accelerated 
acquisition of scalable offensive capabilities.  These are in line with the desires of U.S. Cyber 
Command head Admiral Michael Rogers who wants to structure Cyber Command teams much 
more like special operations forces and give local commanders more license to use offensive 
cyber weapons (Tucker, 2017).  Obviously, a predictable effect necessitates an efficient and 
appropriate cyber lethality prediction methodology.   
As in the case for kinetic weapons, the objectives of a cyber weapon lethality and 
effectiveness prediction process are to promote consistency and improve weapon system 
evaluation accuracy across DoD.  Without a proper assessment and prediction process, 
commanders will remain reluctant to employ cyber weapons.  Consistency is implemented 
through a common set of definitions and assumptions that are used by each of the Services to 
produce weapon system performance estimates. This commonality ensures that significant 
differences, if any, are attributable to the weapon system and threat characteristics rather than the 
methods employed by the individual Services. Also, standardization facilitates a common 
interpretation and meaningful comparison of weapon system performance.  Thus, the predictions 
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delivered by a cyber effectiveness analysis are likely to be accepted by the warfighting 
community.   
Given the various effects capable to be enacted by cyber weapons, the lethality and 
effectiveness prediction methodology must be robust enough to be tailored to suit each particular 
analysis.  That means there must be some common structure that gives the analyst leeway to 
develop assessments against threats and for kill effects not yet encountered.   
 
3.2 Existing Process to Assess Kinetic Weapons 
The process established to assess kinetic weapons has been long established and 
understood by the tri-service lethality and effectiveness community.  The process allows an 
analyst to assess the physical interactions between ordnance and the threat and to determine if 
the resulting damage is sufficient to negate the threat’s mission.  There are multiple steps to the 
process.   
Once a threat system is identified the analyst must collect intelligence on the threat and 
identify critical system elements.  Using a standardized format, a Threat Geometry Model 
(TGM) is created to show the physical interconnectivities of components and, if appropriate, the 
significant crew members.  A critical systems analysis is developed to illustrate the functional 
connections.  Once a desired kill level is associated with the threat, a Failure Analysis Logic Tree 
(FALT) for the system components is developed to indicate which components factor into 
damage effects.  A typical FALT structure is illustrated in Figure 3.  A Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) follows to link particular damaged components to functional 
degradations.   
 




Figure 3 Typical Failure Analysis Logic Tree (FALT) 
 
Component vulnerabilities are estimated based upon test data, computational physics 
hydrocode analyses, or engineering level analyses.  Most component vulnerability inputs are 
generated using engineering level analysis. Examples include:  
• Penetration equations/program with a spreadsheet, and  
• Specialized algorithms (e.g., Jacobs-Roslund equation for explosive detonation) 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 2014).   
An example graph of component fragility curves (also known as probability of damage 
curves) is shown in Figure 4.  It shows that given a force of x the component designated with the 
yellow curve will be damaged with a higher probability than the components designated by the 
red and blue curves.   
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Once the TGM has been constructed and the fragility of components estimated, the threat 
vulnerability process is completed.  The second part of the JTCG/ME process pertains to 
characterizing U.S. weapons.  This is done using standard data collection methods appropriate to 
the weapon effects type.  For fragmentation weapons, data is collected for fragment masses, 
shape, velocities, and material.  The data is saved in a zonal data (“z-data”) file.  For blast 
weapons, a Comp B or TNT equivalent explosive charge weight is determined.  Penetration data 
is collected for projectiles and shaped charge devices.  Lastly, for laser weapons, propagation 
and irradiance on the threat is calculated using engineering-level simulation codes that utilize the 
expected engagement geometry and the TGM information.   
Given the completed vulnerability assessment and the weapon characteristics, an analyst 
can pair the threat with a weapon and perform a lethality estimate.  This estimate provides a 
probability of kill given a hit (PK/H) on the threat and is dependent upon the munition 
characteristics, the threat vulnerability, the kill definition criteria, the velocity and orientation at 
impact.  Driels provides examples of kill definitions as shown in Table 1 (Driels M. R., 2013).   
 
Table 1  Examples of Kill Definitions 
Target Type Kill Definitions 
Land Vehicles K – catastrophic kill (not repairable) 
M0 – mobility kill (cannot move, immediately 
M40 – mobility kill (cannot move within 40 minutes) 
F – firepower kill (cannot fire) 
Parked Aircraft PTO – repairs requiring at least 5 minutes 
PTO4 – repairs requiring at least 4 hours 
PTO24 – repairs requiring at least 24 hours 
Personnel (standing) Defense (prevent) within 30 seconds 
Assault (prevent) within 30 seconds 
Assault (prevent) within 5 minutes 
Supply (prevent) within 12 hours 
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For a typical lethality estimate, each point on threat is assigned a single shot PK/H.  The 
calculations at each point include penetration, blast, and fragmentation effects.  The results are 
illustrated in an image called a “vulnagram” to highlight the best aimpoints for maximum effects.  
A sample vulnagram is shown in Figure 5 (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 




Figure 5  Vulnagram of a Small Boat Threat 
 
The effectiveness of a weapon is defined as the Probability of Kill (PK) and is the product 
of many probabilities.  Often the equation is truncated to PK = Ph * (Pd/h * Pk/d) because the 
analyst assumes that prior events occurred to position the kinetic weapon at the intersect point.  
Ph is the accuracy term and (Pd/h * Pk/d) is the lethality term (equivalent to PK|H in the previous 
paragraph.  Simulation codes such as Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model and Effectiveness 
ToolBox calculate these terms.  Figure 6 illustrates a typical effectiveness equation for a missile 
intercept event (Zurasky, 2015).  For the most part, all of the probabilities to the left of the end-
game values (Ph, Pd/h, and Pk/d) are nearly equivalent to one.  The true variability is associated 
with the warhead interactions.   





Figure 6  Kinetic System Effectiveness Kill Chain 
 
3.3 Inherent Differences Between Cyber Weapons and Kinetic Weapons 
Weapons can impart damage to threats in several ways.  Kinetic weapons cause damage 
through physical means such as blast, fragment penetration, and heat effects.  Kinetic weapons 
are effective when the damage caused to the threat results in the failure of critical components.  
Cyber weapons do not interact physically with threats; rather, they manipulate software to 
achieve effects.   
A high explosive blast warhead is designed to achieve damage through overpressure 
effects.  Upon detonation, the high explosive material converts to a gas at extremely high 
pressure and temperature.  The pressure of the expanding gas fractures the weapon case and 
allows the gas to escape.  The air surrounding the case is then compressed and a blast (shock) 
wave is transmitted through it.  Blast weapons are particularly effective against buildings and 
personnel in the open.  This is because when a threat is exposed to a blast wave, it will 
experience the overpressure and under-pressure effects.  The internal cavities on insufficiently 
reinforced bodies reflect and amplify the blast wave.   This causes injuries in the lungs, 
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gastrointestinal tract, and ears in humans and damage in equipment compartments and manned 
spaces in buildings and vehicles.   
Fragmenting weapons and projectiles both operate on the same premise:  masses 
accelerated to great velocities impacting and penetrating materials.  In the case of a fragmenting 
warhead, hundreds of naturally-forming or scored fragments are ejected from the explosion in 
the path or proximity of the threat.  A certain number of the fragments intersect and penetrate the 
body of the threat.  The depth and volume of the penetration is dependent upon the mass of the 
fragment and its impact velocity.  Similarly, a projectile penetrates material by exerting extreme 
force on a point-like small area on the threat.  Its depth of penetration is again dependent upon 
the mass of the projectile.  The effectiveness of a fragmenting or projectile weapon depends upon 
its ability to penetrate and damage a critical component.   
Laser weapons focus a concentrated beam of visible or invisible light at a point on a 
threat.  This light energy is absorbed by the intercepting body and converted to heat.  The 
temperature increase of the material causes its weakening and deformations.  Given enough 
heating, material may melt away and expose internal components.  Burning occurs if the 
temperature exceeds the material’s ignition point.   
Kinetic weapons interact physically with threats in accordance with the laws of physics.  
For example, as shown in Figure 7, a blast wave appears as a rapid rise from ambient to a peak 
pressure point which is followed by an exponential decay to a value below ambient.  It then 
returns to the ambient condition.  The penetration of fragments or projectiles follow Newton’s 
Second Law of Motion and requires the weapon to overcome the resistive force of the threat 
material (Zook, 1977).  Lastly, the irradiance of a laser on a threat is dependent upon the output 
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power, atmospheric attenuation, and beam quality characteristics such as beam width and 
divergence.   
 
 
Figure 7  Pressure-Time Profile of a Blast Wave 
 
Cyber weapons allow practitioners to compromise computers and processors by 
identifying important data to manipulate, steal, or destroy.  Cyber weapon penetration into a 
system is not achieved physically.  Instead, cyber weapons leverage inter-computer protocols to 
gain access to threat computers.  Some cyber weapons engage networking and administrative 
tools to probe and map networks and to conduct lateral movements across networks.  Other cyber 
weapons actually manipulate the computer code to alter the output of algorithms.  These cyber 
weapons, however, do not directly rely upon the laws of physics to inflict damage.  That is, 
weaponized code does not come with an explosive charge.  Potential physical damage must be 
created by the targeted system itself through stopping or altering ongoing processes (Rid & 










Blast Wave Form 
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3.4 Initial Proposed Process to Assess Cyber Weapons 
Similar to kinetic weapon assessments, a cyber lethality methodology must include the 
following:   
• Identification and definition of cyber kill effects,  
• Cyber threat vulnerability assessment,  
• Cyber weapon characterization, and  
• Cyber lethality estimate generation.   
 
Identification and Definition of Cyber Kill Effects 
The first element of the common structure is a common set of kill criteria.  In some cases, 
a cyber weapon may enact effects that cause physical damage similar to a kinetic weapon.  For 
example, a cyber weapon that causes a servo controller to turn off will induce the same failures 
to a flight system as those caused by a penetrating projectile damaging the same servo controller.   
The existing definitions for mobility kill and firepower kill still apply to cyber weapons 
for those effects that cause physical damage.  Mobility kills are those where the damage or effect 
is sufficient to render a platform incapable of executing controlled movement within the time 
interval being assessed.  Firepower kills are those where the damage or effect is sufficient to 
render the threat immediately incapable of engaging its weapon.  On the other hand, cyber 
weapons do not appear to contribute to Crew kills.  Crew kills are those where injury or effects 
to the crew are such that they are incapacitated and enough crewmembers are incapacitated such 
that the threat’s mission cannot be accomplished. 
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However, the added variation in cyber effects makes the prediction of cyber weapon 
effectiveness problematic.  The outcomes of some of these effects do not directly correspond to 
existing kinetic weapon kill definitions.  Cyber-specific kill effects include:   
• Denial of Service – computer or network resources are made unavailable to intended 
users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the 
Internet 
• Misinformation – false or incorrect information is spread intentionally 
• Data Modification – data is inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that is intended to 
appear genuine to the user 
• Data Repudiation – data or information is made to appear to be invalid or misleading 
• Spoofing – an attempt to masquerade as someone else 
• Network Enumeration – usernames and info on groups, shares, and services of 
networked computers are retrieved  
These need to have quantifiable metrics associated with them.  They need to have a time 
associated with the initial effect and they need to have an associated duration period.  The 
following are initial proposals; completed definitions will have to be reviewed and accepted at 
the tri-service level.  Note that some cyber effects have a lasting effect.  That is, the effect 
continues to exist until a corrective action is taken by the adversary.   
• Denial of Service –  
o Kill/Effect:  damage or effect to the threat system resulting in its disruption of 
service 
o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  5 minutes (DoS), four hours (DoS4), or 24 hours (DoS24) 
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• Misinformation –  
o Kill/Effect:  false or incorrect information is spread intentionally 
o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  5 minutes (MisI), four hours (MisI4), or 24 hours (MisI24) 
• Data Modification –  
o Kill/Effect:  data is successfully inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that 
is intended to appear genuine to the adversary 
o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  5 minutes (DMod), four hours (DMod 4), or 24 hours (DMod 
24) 
• Data Repudiation –  
o Kill/Effect:  data or information is successfully made to appear to be invalid 
or misleading 
o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  5 minutes (DRep), four hours (DRep 4), or 24 hours (DRep 
24) 
• Spoofing –  
o Kill/Effect:  successfully masquerading as someone else 
o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  indeterminate 
• Network Enumeration –  
o Kill/Effect:  successfully retrieving usernames and info on groups, shares, and 
services of networked computers  
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o Time Start:  immediate 
o Time Duration:  indeterminate 
It is important to note that Misinformation and Repudiation must provide the adversary 
with the proper balance of belief and disbelief.  Libicki writes that prior beliefs or opinions drive 
how users interpret information.  Users are more likely to believe something to be true if it 
supports their prior thoughts.  This is especially true when they rely upon their beliefs and fail to 
research the information that is presented (Libicki, 2007).   
Other cyber effects are likely to be added in the future.  However, these are sufficient to 
develop a general methodology.   
 
Cyber Threat Vulnerability Assessment 
Similar to kinetic weapon assessments, a multi-phase cyber lethality threat vulnerability 
assessment must include the following:  (1) selection of the threat, (2) definition of the system 
boundaries and identification of critical components, and (3) identification of component 
vulnerabilities.  Figure 8 illustrates a typical network diagram with firewalls and an intrusion 
detection system.  These are typical system components which must be described.  Any such 
network may also include wifi and smart phones.  Other example networks include Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for remote monitoring and control and 
dedicated military systems with stand-alone dedicated processors.   
 




Figure 8  Typical Network Diagram 
 
In Phase 1, the analyst will identify the threat and begin to gather baseline information.  
This will include a brief description of the threat, relevant photos or schematic drawings, top 
level FALTs, and a list of assumptions pertinent to the analysis.  It is important to recognize that 
the complexity of the threat will affect the type and amount of information available.  Is it a 
multi-faceted system with numerous nodes or is it a distinct element like a cell phone or a 
website?  Is it is a commercially available product like a communications center or is it a limited-
access product like a military radar system?  If it is a limited-access product, does it include 
commercial components?  Are specifications widely available?  Can failures in the threat system 
be easily determined?   
In Phase 2, the analyst will begin to develop a threat model to include a detailed 
description of the threat, a network model (if appropriate), a detailed FALT, and a FMEA.  For a 
cyber evaluation, the physical components of the threat are less significant.  Instead, the software 
code and its functional elements are the items to be evaluated.  The system boundaries are 
important when developing the network model.  Too broad of a system boundary leads to an 
overly complex system definition; too narrow of a boundary may exclude key elements that are 
affected by the weapon.  The key aspect of Phase 2 is the FMEA.  It identifies the critical 
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functional elements and the conditions that need to be altered in order to change the state of the 
threat system and achieve the desired effect.  For example, the FMEA can identify a servo 
controller as a single point failure node.  A well-designed cyber weapon can then alter the state 
of the servo causing loss of system control.   
When determining the boundaries of the threat, the question may be raised:  should the 
network path be considered part of the cyber threat characterization or is it part of the cyber 
weapon characterization since the weapon cannot exist without the network?  Or is it part of the 
environment, merely the medium through which the weapon travels to its targeted threat?  This 
author holds the position that the network path is independent of both the threat and the weapon 
but it is important because it enables the access points associated with the threat.   
In Phase 3, the analyst will identify the vulnerability of the identified critical cyber 
components.  The vulnerability can be considered a flaw in the software or environment that can 
be exploited.  Identified flaws without an exploitation path are not vulnerabilities; they are 
merely design weaknesses.  Vulnerabilities can exist in the threat system design, within installed 
software, within its network configuration, or be associated with its business operations.  Some 
known vulnerabilities include (Sood & Enbody, 2014):   
• Backdoors and Hardcoded Passwords – hardcoded passwords embedded in the 
firmware that allow attackers who discover them to gain complete access to these 
systems;  
• Remote Code Execution (RCE) – security issues such as buffer overflows (stack, 
heap, and integer), use-after free errors, race conditions, memory corruption, privilege 
escalations, dangling pointers in operating system components, browsers, critical 
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systems such as ICS/SCADA, routers, other software such as Microsoft Office, 
Adobe Reader, Java, etc.;  
• Insecure Protocols, Spoofing and Hijacking – undocumented and insecure protocols 
allow hijacking and spoofing of communication channels 
• SQL Injections – weaknesses in web applications that allow attackers’ queries to be 
executed directly in the backend database; and  
• Insecure Authentication and File Uploading Flaws – security issues arising from 
inability of the systems to implement granular control through proper authentication 
and authorization checks.   
Sood and Enbody list real-world cases associated with these vulnerabilities.  These are 
summarized in Table 2.   
 
Table 2  Significant Cyber Vulnerabilities and Real-World Cases 
Vulnerability Types Real World Cases – Vulnerable Systems 
Backdoors and Hardcoded 
Passwords 
•  Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication 
(SATCOM) systems  provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC, 
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable 
•  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems 
(SCADA) provided by Siemens, TURCK, etc. were 
vulnerable 
Insecure Authentication 
and File Uploading 
•  Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication 
(SATCOM) systems  provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC, 
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable 
Remote Code Execution •  SCADA systems provided by ICONICS GENESIS32, 
BizViz, IntegraXor, Sielco Sistemi, etc. were vulnerable to 
Buffer Overflows 
•  XMLDOM Zero-day vulnerability was exploited to attack 
U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ website 
•  Operation Pawn Storm uses vulnerabilities in MS office 
files to target U.S. military officials 
SQL Injections •  Royal Navy website hacked using SQL Injection 
•  U.S. Army website hacked using SQL Injection 
Insecure Protocols, 
Spoofing and Hijacking 
•  Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication 
(SATCOM) systems  provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC, 
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable 
•  Possible attacks to spoof GPS communication to control 
U.S. drones 
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All of the various cyber components must be listed with their associated vulnerabilities.  
This will provide the cyber weapon designer with a complete description – equivalent to the 
kinetic weapon Threat Geometry Model – against which to choose the most appropriate available 
cyber capability to cause damage.   
 
Cyber Weapon Characterization 
As described in Chapter 2, a cyber weapon is a software capability by which an attacker 
exploits vulnerabilities within a targeted system to cause damage.  None of the kinetic weapon 
characteristics apply:  items such as warhead fragmentation and blast overpressure data, 
guidance methods, fuze functions, and reliability.  Instead, new characteristics will have to be 
developed.  These should be categorized according to cyber weapon’s functional responsibilities:  
Reconnaissance, Lateral Movement, and Payload.   
In order to penetrate and exploit an adversarial network, like the one illustrated in 
Figure 8, some aspect of the cyber weapon will require networking reconnaissance tools to map 
out the threat network, to probe potential avenues, and to monitor activity.  The weapon will be 
required to locate the desired target components and identify ways to get to them.  By utilizing 
host and port scan applications to map out the network resources, the weapon will develop an 
inventory of relevant target components.   The reconnaissance characterization should include 
descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it operates.  Based upon a 
2016 analysis of attack behaviors, the ten most popular networking and hacking reconnaissance 
tools are provided by Table 3.  This report also notes that 99% of reconnaissance and lateral 
movement threats originated from legitimate applications or from riskware (software whose 
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installation and execution poses a potential yet not definite risk to a host computer); only 1% 
originated from malware (Lightcyber, 2016).   
Once the target system has been successfully penetrated, the cyber weapon will have to 
extend across the network to the vulnerable component.  It will do so by using lateral movement 
applications.  Lateral movement allows the attacker to maintain persistence in the network, gain 
control of the administrative privileges, and move to the key vulnerable components.  The lateral 
movement characterization should include descriptions of its function and the operational 
environment in which it operates.  The ten most popular administrative tools for lateral 
movement are provided by Table 4 (Lightcyber, 2016).   
 
Table 3  Reconnaissance – Top Ten Networking and Hacking Tools 
Tool Name Function Percentage of Top 10 
Angry IP Scanner IP address and port scanner 27.08%  
PingInfoView Program that pings multiple hosts at 
once  
25.00%  
Nmap  Network discovery and security 
auditing tool  
14.58%  
Ping  Ping command program  12.50%  
Mimikatz  A tool that extracts plain text 
passwords stored in Windows  
6.25%  
NCrack  High-speed network authentication 
cracker  
4.17%  
Perl  Scripting tool that can be used to script 




A tool that manages Windows logon 
sessions and credentials; can be used to 
perform “Pass-the-Hash” attacks  
2.08%  
SmartSniff  Network packet sniffer  2.08%  
PDF Exploit Generator  An app that generates malicious PDF 




In addition, remote desktop tools are used to move laterally within a network and to 
remotely control elements.  Legitimate Information Technology administrators use them and 
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cyber weapons can utilize them to control elements that have been compromised.  The ten most 
popular remote desktop tools for lateral movement are provided by Table 5 (Lightcyber, 2016).   
 
Table 4  Lateral Movement – Top Ten Administrative Tools 
Tool Name Function Percentage of Top 10 
SecureCRT SecureShell (SSH) and Telnet client  28.48%  
Putty SSH and Telnet client  25.95%  
BeyondExec Remote 
Service  
Utility to spawn processes and 




Management utility for VMware 
vSphere Server Virtualization  
8.86%  
MobaXterm  Xserver and tabbed SSH client for 
Windows  
8.23%  
PsExec  Light-weight telnet replacement for 
executing processes on remote systems  
8.23%  
PowerShell  Task automation and configuration 
management framework  
5.70%  
Private Shell SSH SSH client  1.90%  
Telnet  Telnet client  1.90%  
Xshell  Terminal emulator that supports SSH, 
SFTP, telnet, rlogin and serial access  
0.63%  
 
Table 5  Lateral Movement -- Top Ten Remote Desktop Tools 
Tool Name Function Percentage of Top 10 
TeamViewer  Cloud-based or locally hosted remote desktop 
and web conferencing software; can be used for 
command and control and lateral movement  
37.22%  
WinVNC  Remote desktop software using Virtual 
Network Computing (VNC) for remote access  
27.44%  
Radmin  Remote desktop and technical support software  9.09%  
AnyDesk  Remote desktop software  6.86%  





Cloud-based or locally hosted secure remote 
access  
2.92%  
Ammyy Adminn  Free remote desktop and remote control 
software  
1.72%  
Citrix Client  Application used to access Citrix XenDesktop 




Microsoft’s native remote desktop solution  0.69%  
UltraVNC  Remote desktop software that also includes file 
transfer and chat messaging  
0.34%  
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In addition to the reconnaissance and lateral movement functions, a cyber weapon must 
deploy a payload.  Payload refers to the component of a computer code that executes an activity 
that is unwanted by the targeted system.  This does not include the reconnaissance and lateral 
movement code required to get the payload packet to its destination. Some example effects of 
payloads are data manipulation or destruction, interrupted or inconsistent messages, and the 
delivery of spam emails through an infected user's account.  Payloads can be developed by black 
hat hackers and by government operatives.   
The payload characterization should include descriptions of its function and the 
operational environment in which it operates.  For example, the characterization should indicate 
that it exfiltrates data from computers that utilize the Windows 10 operating system.   
 
Cyber Lethality/Effectiveness Estimate Generation 
The lethality/effectiveness estimate is the point in the process where the analyst predicts 
component response to the weapon.  Determining Probability of Kill (PK) or another lethality 
metric is the final piece of the system effectiveness process.  For a kinetic weapon system, PK is 
often part of the system requirements.  It is also used by logisticians to determine weapon load-
out and by mission planners to develop tactics.  Even though there are not production line or 
storage magazine concerns relating to cyber weapons, mission planners and combatant 
commanders will be critically concerned about the effectiveness of the weapon when it is 
deployed.  Commanders must have confidence in weapons before using them.  This is especially 
true when physical damage may not be evident as confirmation.   
An effectiveness equation for a typical missile intercept event was illustrated in Figure 6.  
In that model it is clear that the majority of the uncertainty, and the associated probabilities, 
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occur after the engagement begins.  Similar kill chain models for cyber engagements have been 
developed by Lockheed Martin and Mandiant (now FireEye) for an advanced persistent threat 
(APT) attack.  Figure 9 shows the similarities between these models (Holmes, 2015).  In both of 
them there are distinct stages of the engagement.  The duration of these stages are much longer 
than the stages of a kinetic engagement.  In addition, the pre-compromise stage where 
reconnaissance occurs is actually prior to the engagement start; that is, prior to when the 
commander wants to engage the cyber weapon.   
 
Figure 9  Cyber Kill Chain Models 
 
Since these APT attack phases are well defined and understood by the cyber community, 
these have been selected to form the basis for an initial cyber effectiveness relationship.  As in 
the case of the kinetic effectiveness equation, cyber effectiveness is calculated by multiplying the 
probability of various contributors.  The most significant difference between the kinetic and the 
cyber effectiveness models is the cyber weapon payload probability of success can likely be 
   
 
33
considered equal to one.  It has been tested and proven in a lab setting to perform the action 
necessary to achieve the desired kill effect.  However, the other events leading up to the payload 
activation have differing uncertainties.   
In order to add meaning to the kill chain, it is necessary to associate probabilities with 
each of these steps:  Intelligence (Reconnaissance), Delivery, and Exploitation.   
Thus, the cyber equivalent to the kinetic equation in Figure 6 can be shown as the 
following relationship:   
Pk = f(PIntel  * PDeliv * PExploit) where 
• PIntel  is dependent upon the probabilities of the knowledge of access points, hardware 
and software configurations, completeness of network map, understanding of 
operations tempo, and the latency (or timeliness) of information (PIntel  = f(PAccess  * 
PConfig * PMap * PTempo * PLatent)),  
• PDeliv is dependent upon the likelihood of a patch to address software vulnerabilities 
being implemented and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery (PDeliv  =  
f(PPatch  * PIT)), and  
• PExploit = is the likelihood that the payload will achieve the desired mission effects.   
Note that PDeliv is actually a product of the survival rule for PPatch and PIT because a poor 
response by the defending asset gives a greater likelihood of success by the attacker.  Also, other 
factors may also be included in the PIntel  and PDeliv terms.  Some of these uncertainty factors 
include the likelihood of knowing the password or having the proper credentials, the chance that 
a hardware upgrade has occurred, the impact of network congestion on the timing of the attack, 
and even if the proper node has been targeted.  A cyber reconnaissance tool may be required to 
ascertain all the appropriate factors and to quantify their impacts on the likelihood of success.  
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The reconnaissance tool may also be necessary to confirm that the correct element has been 
targeted.  Figure 10 shows the resulting cyber effectiveness relationship for a path through an 
example network.   
 
Figure 10  Cyber System Effectiveness Kill Chain 
 
Upon completion of the cyber lethality/effectiveness evaluation, the information must be 
documented for the user.  This is done by creating a Cyber JMEM for the product.  Remember 
that the JMEM information includes damage/kill probabilities for specific weapons and threats, 
physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon systems, threat vulnerability, 
obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and procedures for assessing 
munitions effectiveness.  In the case of a Cyber JMEM, the weapon must be described in terms 
of an exploit – a means by which the attacker uses a vulnerability to cause damage to the target 
system.  The Cyber JMEM will provide the commander with the necessary information to 
choose the most appropriate attack means to achieve his or her operational mission.   
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The commander makes this decision through the process outlined in Joint Publication 
3-60, Joint Targeting.  Targeting is a systematic process which enables the commander to 
analyze and prioritize targets and then match appropriate lethal and non-lethal actions to those 
targets to achieve specific desired effects. Targeting links the desired effects to actions and tasks 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2013).  The Joint Targeting process is illustrated in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11  Joint Targeting Cycle 
 
For engagements implemented with kinetic weapons, there is significant data and 
accredited models available to estimate system performance.  Threat models, or approved 
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surrogates, exist to allow for the selection and prioritization of targets.  Performance models can 
readily predict performance of specific weapons against those targets.  The results of these are 
summarized in JMEM documents.  In order for cyber weapons to be considered as a viable 
capability, an equivalent level of maturity must be obtained.  That is, target models must be 
created and verified, weapon characteristics must be standardized and thorough, and 
performance models must be developed and accredited so that the operational forces will trust 
the findings.   The Cyber JMEM will encapsulate this information for the commander.   
 
3.5 Follow-on Tasks and Research 
The methodology proposed here is intended to support the tri-service cyber teams and 
mission planners.  An operationally relevant cyberspace lethality and effectiveness tool is an 
unmet need of the cyber community.  Ultimately, a fielded cyber JMEM tool that incorporates 
accredited cyberspace quantitative and qualitative models, effectiveness data on cyberspace 
delivered effects/associated risks, and potential collateral consequences of employing cyberspace 
effects mechanisms is desired.  The proposed methodology is a first-cut attempt to conduct a 
cyberspace vulnerability characterization and a cyber weapon lethality assessment.   But it 
cannot be implemented without additional work and without the cooperation of the other 
JTCG/ME and U.S. Cyber Command activities.   
Aspects of this proposal were presented to the JTCG/ME through existing contacts via 
the NSWCDD Lethality and Effectiveness Branch.  A JTCG/ME Joint Non-Kinetic Effects 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) exists to consider these types of issues.  The methodology 
was discussed by the CCB and has formed the basis for future efforts.   
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The first task – create data standards for the target, weapon, and network models – has 
been initiated.  With these, the practitioners at U.S. Cyber Command can be engaged to help 
finalize the standard formats and content for the cyber target vulnerability model and the cyber 
weapon characterization.  The formats must be acceptable so that they become adopted across 
the community.  The cyber target vulnerability model can, based upon experience, be modified 
to reflect changes to the cyber domain and the types and characteristics of potential targets.  The 
cyber weapon characterization is critical information for the cyber JMEM product.  Ongoing 
dialogue is necessary and expected to develop these formats.  Cyber target and weapon data 
requirements will be gathered through discussions with various types of government and 
academic personnel including:  basic research individuals, weapon system developers, analysts, 
system modelers, intelligence analysts, vulnerability experts, and weapon system program 
managers.  The analysis must consider the scope, level, and duration necessary to construct 
target models and cyber payloads that encompass the physical, functional, or behavioral state 
changes typically associated with mission and damage criterion of the target.  Standard business 
tools such as surveys and working groups will be used to develop a consensus.  The products will 
be qualitative in nature since there is no numeric value that can be associated with a template.   
Clearly, the effectiveness relationship for cyber operations also needs to be reviewed, 
critiqued, investigated, and improved.  The initial proposal needs to be examined by the cyber 
professionals and they must be presented with the opportunity to refine the variables. Therefore, 
the second research task will determine the factors and numeric contributions of the cyber 
effectiveness kill chain factors.  This will require the creation of test standards and the collection 
of appropriate data to build quantitative assessment values.  Test and evaluation requirements 
will be gathered through discussions with government and academic personnel.  The proposed 
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cyber relationship will be presented to the cyber teams for their critique.  Feedback will be used 
to modify the relationship with the intent to eventually formulate a cyber effectiveness equation.  
Most importantly, the terms and values associated with the relationship contributors will be 
adopted.  Test data will then be gathered and analyzed to determine confidence values or bins.  
The goal is to create a standard by which required organizations can adequately and succinctly 
capture the performance of a cyberspace capability and its unique configuration against a target 
and its unique attributes.   
It is the author’s belief that value of the weaponization element of the effectiveness 
relationship (PExploit) should be one since testing can be concentrated and extensive.  It is up to 
the test community to prove this to be true by demonstrating that tests and test reports cover all 
criteria.  This will give the combatant commanders confidence that the cyber payload will 
achieve the desired mission effects.  This will have the subsequent effect of increasing the 
commander’s confidence that cyber is a viable option so that more than just kinetic weapons will 
be considered part of the available arsenal.   
These research tasks have either begun or should be initiated this fall with the anticipated 
completion by the end of September, 2018.  This will allow the DoD cyber community ample 
time to implement the standards in Fiscal Year 2019 and beyond.  
A larger research area that is beyond the scope of this paper pertains to the effectiveness 
model for cyber operations in support of information operations information-related influence 
efforts.  These are efforts that attempt to inform, influence, and persuade others to change their 
behavior or attitudes.  They are often directed at the strategic level, but there are situations where 
they are necessary at the operational area.  The effectiveness of cyber operations to influence the 
attitudes and behavior at hard-to-reach or challenging audiences needs to be researched.  This 
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type of assessment goes beyond altering computer commands and, thus, the value for PExploit is 
likely to be less than one.  A thoughtful evaluation of identifying objectives and measuring 
progress toward those objectives must be completed and the results folded back into the cyber 
effectiveness relationship.   
While it is being completed and implemented, it will be important that NSWCDD and the 
other organizations that support the JTCG/ME develop a workforce that is suited to evaluating 
cyber weapons.  It is recommended that knowledge, skills, and abilities criteria be established 
and the workforce be trained to achieve them.  Existing commercially available training should 
be evaluated to determine its applicability.  If it is found to be lacking, specialized training 
should be procured.  It may be possible to coordinate with the other Services to create a 
schoolhouse for analysts and operators.  Defining the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities 
may be the subject of follow-on research.   





Progress has begun on the tasks outlined in this proposal but there is much more to 
accomplish.  This will require continued collaboration between various activities.   
 
4.1 Proposal Acceptance 
As indicated, the proposal has been adopted by the JTCG/ME.  The Joint Non-Kinetic 
Effects CCB has adopted the structure of this proposal as the basis for the cyber JMEM 
development effort.  Tasks have been initiated to define data standards to define the weapon 
characterization, the target vulnerability characterization, and the operational environment 
characterization.  These tasks are being led by different groups within the JTCG/ME.  The 
products will be reviewed and, if satisfactory, adopted by the CCB.   
The author, on behalf of the CCB, also presented the concept to the JTCG/ME Steering 
Committee in late spring, 2017.  The Steering Committee reviews and approves task proposals 
on a fiscal year basis.  The Steering Committee noted that there is much work to be done but 
agreed to the overall process.  Some members of the Steering Committee, in particular, noted 
that this work must be done in a close relationship with the U.S. Cyber Command and its cyber 
mission teams.   
The Steering Committee met again in early November to approve tasks for Fiscal Year 
2018.  Approval of the cyber tasks outlined by the Joint Non-Kinetic Effects CCB is considered 
to be confirmation of the soundness of the proposal by an independent body.  On 26 October, the 
chair of the Steering Committee was briefed in advance of the meeting.  She indicated that she 
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understands the basis for the proposal and would like to be kept well-informed of the progress.  
The full Steering Committee subsequently approved the cyber tasks as proposed.   
 
4.2 Engaging U.S. Cyber Command 
In accordance with the consensus of the JTCG/ME Steering Committee, the first task of 
this proposal requires engagement and collaboration with U.S. Cyber Command.  Initial efforts 
have begun to standardize the cyber lethality data standards.  With funding in FY18, operational 
user group meetings will be conducted with participants from the cyber combat mission teams.  
These teams are being established to provide support to Combatant Commands by generating 
integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2017).  Their purpose is to achieve military and security objectives with 
precision such that there is minimal loss of life and property.   
Since not all commands will be able to attend simultaneously, multiple operational user 
group meetings will be held.  They will be conducted at various commands to reduce the travel 
and time demands on the operators.  The developers and operators will be surveyed to determine 
how they currently document weapon characteristics, targets, and the operational environment.  
The initial draft standards will be discussed and recommendations taken to improve them.  
Minutes will be taken and the results will be incorporated into later versions of the data 
standards.   
Operational user groups will also be utilized to help determine cyber kill definitions.  The 
cyber mission teams will each likely have a particular area of focus and expertise.  So, in 
addition to achieving a consensus on the data standards, it will be important to understand the 
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different kinds of effects they intend to implement.  This will drive the cyber-specific kill effects 
and definitions.   
Test results from the mission cyber teams and other activities will be evaluated to 
confirm the hypothesis that the probability that a particular cyber weapon works against a target 
is either one or zero.  Other uncertainty metrics, however, will remain to be evaluated.  The 
operational user groups will be used to determine the criteria that make up the PIntel, PDeliv, and 
PExploit terms.  The probabilities associated with each of these will likely be determined by the 
Intelligence Community.   
This task will be considered successfully achieved if upgraded data standards are 
finalized by the end of September 2018, initial uncertainty metrics are compiled, and the test data 
confirms or refutes the hypothesis that a well-defined cyber weapon can be considered to have a 
probability of one against particular targets.   
 




5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary 
This dissertation describes the lethality prediction processes for kinetic and directed 
energy weapons and outlines the research necessary to develop a methodology to implement a 
cyber weapon lethality process.  It is noted that cyber mechanisms can induce different kinds of 
effects and can be reversible.  Cyber targets and environments are also likely to be more dynamic 
than traditional military targets.  Therefore the existing kinetic processes must be tailored to 
account for the different timelines necessary to design and engage cyber targets.  Since the armed 
forces understand and utilize the JTCG/ME process for kinetic weapons, the cyber methodology 
will mirror that process as applicable.   
The current cyber JMEM development effort being undertaken by the JTCG/ME is 
utilizing this methodology.  The concept was presented to the JTCG/ME Steering Committee in 
the late spring and the proposed tasks for Fiscal Year 2018 are meant to implement it.  The 
Steering Committee met in early November and approved the cyber tasks for Fiscal Year 2018.   
 
5.2 Recommendation 
The cyber lethality methodology will be developed over the next several years.  During 
that time, additional studies and efforts are recommended.   
In order to ensure that all parties describe the weapons, targets, and networks 
consistently, the JTCG/ME must collaborate with U.S. Cyber Command, the cyber mission 
teams, and the cyber test community to confirm that the data standards are accurate and 
implementable.  Likewise, to most efficiently develop the cyber effectiveness equation, the same 
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collaborative effort must be utilized to review, critique, and refine the variables that will 
comprise it.  User groups will allow all parties to provide their recommendations and 
explanations.   
Kinetic weapons operate solely in the physical domain.  As shown in Figure 1, 
cyberspace encompasses three layers:  the physical network layer, the logical network layer, and 
the cyber-persona layer.  An additional academic study may investigate the cyber lethality 
nuances associated with the various cyber layers.  There may be different factors associated with 
each cyberspace layer.  This study may provide insights into the fault trees associated with the 
layers and potential collateral effects.  The temporal relationships of cyber-personas may also 
result in corrections or corollaries to the cyber lethality relationship equation.   
Physics-based models exist that allow analysts to predict the performance of kinetic and 
directed energy weapons.  The same spectrum of tools does not exist for cyber evaluations.  An 
academic study of the available cyber ranges and tools would be beneficial to the community by 
recognizing the state-of-the-art methodologies and identifying gaps in the community’s 
simulation capabilities.   
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